spoofed audio
Investigating Causal Cues: Strengthening Spoofed Audio Detection with Human-Discernible Linguistic Features
Khanjani, Zahra, Ale, Tolulope, Wang, Jianwu, Davis, Lavon, Mallinson, Christine, Janeja, Vandana P.
Several types of spoofed audio, such as mimicry, replay attacks, and deepfakes, have created societal challenges to information integrity. Recently, researchers have worked with sociolinguistics experts to label spoofed audio samples with Expert Defined Linguistic Features (EDLFs) that can be discerned by the human ear: pitch, pause, word-initial and word-final release bursts of consonant stops, audible intake or outtake of breath, and overall audio quality. It is established that there is an improvement in several deepfake detection algorithms when they augmented the traditional and common features of audio data with these EDLFs. In this paper, using a hybrid dataset comprised of multiple types of spoofed audio augmented with sociolinguistic annotations, we investigate causal discovery and inferences between the discernible linguistic features and the label in the audio clips, comparing the findings of the causal models with the expert ground truth validation labeling process. Our findings suggest that the causal models indicate the utility of incorporating linguistic features to help discern spoofed audio, as well as the overall need and opportunity to incorporate human knowledge into models and techniques for strengthening AI models. The causal discovery and inference can be used as a foundation of training humans to discern spoofed audio as well as automating EDLFs labeling for the purpose of performance improvement of the common AI-based spoofed audio detectors.
How Do Neural Spoofing Countermeasures Detect Partially Spoofed Audio?
Liu, Tianchi, Zhang, Lin, Das, Rohan Kumar, Ma, Yi, Tao, Ruijie, Li, Haizhou
Partially manipulating a sentence can greatly change its meaning. Recent work shows that countermeasures (CMs) trained on partially spoofed audio can effectively detect such spoofing. However, the current understanding of the decision-making process of CMs is limited. We utilize Grad-CAM and introduce a quantitative analysis metric to interpret CMs' decisions. We find that CMs prioritize the artifacts of transition regions created when concatenating bona fide and spoofed audio. This focus differs from that of CMs trained on fully spoofed audio, which concentrate on the pattern differences between bona fide and spoofed parts. Our further investigation explains the varying nature of CMs' focus while making correct or incorrect predictions. These insights provide a basis for the design of CM models and the creation of datasets. Moreover, this work lays a foundation of interpretability in the field of partial spoofed audio detection that has not been well explored previously.